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Abstract: In this paper electoral disproportionality is split into two types: (1) Forced or unavoidable,
due to the very nature of the apportionment problem; and (2) non-forced. While disproportionality
indexes proposed in the literature do not distinguish between such components, we design an index,
called “quota index”, just measuring avoidable disproportionality. Unlike the previous indexes, the
new one can be zero in real situations. Furthermore, this index presents an interesting interpretation
concerning transfers of seats. Properties of the quota index and relationships with some usual
disproportionality indexes are analyzed. Finally, an empirical approach is undertaken for different
countries and elections.
Keywords: electoral systems; proportionality; electoral quota; disproportionality indexes;
measurement; Spain; Sweden; Germany
1. Introduction
Electoral systems are mechanisms by which votes become seats in a parliament. In order to
reflect the overall distribution of voters’ preferences, some of these systems advocate for proportional
representation, so that political parties will receive percentages of seats corresponding to their
respective percentages of votes. Since a seat cannot be divided, it is impossible to assign exactly
the obtained vote shares in seat terms. This apportionment problem generates something known as
electoral disproportionality. Consequently, some parties are overrepresented while others become
underrepresented. Even more, disproportionality may increase, due to the existence of many districts
and electoral thresholds.
There is not an agreement about an instrument to determine such distortions generated during
the process of translating votes into seats and many efforts have been made to measure them.
Disproportionality indexes are usually employed to this aim and there exists a wide literature on
this approach.
A survey compilation of indexes resulting from the application of different techniques is presented
by Taagepera and Grofman (2003) (see also Taagepera 2007; Karpov 2008; Chessa and Fragnelli 2012;
Goldenberg and Fisher 2017). These authors also develop an interesting analysis of the properties
that they fulfill. From a computational point of view, Ocaña and Oñate (2011) presents a software
for calculating nine disproportionality indexes. On the other hand, Koppel and Diskin (2009) and
Boyssou et al. (2016) propose axiomatizations for some indexes measuring disproportionality. Finally,
relationships among some disproportionality indexes appear in Borisyuk et al. (2004) and Bolun (2012).
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All the proposed indexes measure deviations (in some way) from exact proportionality, which is
not affordable in practice. Balinski and Young (2001, pp. 79–83) deals with a more realistic requirement
concerning the apportionment problem: No party’s representation should deviate from its quota
(number of seats that should be received by the parties in exact proportionality) by more than one
unit. In other words, no party should get less than its quota rounded down, nor more than its quota
rounded up. This property is called “staying within the quota” or “verification of the quota rule”.
Taking into account that usually the quota is not an integer number, votes-seats disproportionality
could be non-forced (if the quota rule is not satisfied), or forced, otherwise.
This paper presents a new index that just measures non-forced disproportionality, avoiding that
inherent to the fact that exact proportionality is unfeasible, as pointed out. Remarkably, this index is
zero if and only if the quota condition is satisfied. Even more, from this index, it is possible to obtain
the minimum number of seats that would be necessary to transfer from some parties to others, so that
the distribution of parliament seats will satisfy the quota condition.
The paper has the following structure: Section 2 introduces the notation and basic concepts,
paying particular attention to the quota. Section 3 presents some of the most used disproportionality
indexes, namely: The maximum deviation, Loosemore-Hanby and Gallagher indexes. Section 4
introduces a new index, which will be called “quota index”. Section 5 shows the properties that the
last index verifies and some relationships with the previous disproportionality indexes. In Section 6
the aforementioned indexes are computed for different elections in Spain, Sweden and Germany,
and comparisons among them are established. In Section 7, some conclusions are presented. Finally,
technical proofs, electoral results and data resources are left in Appendices A–C, respectively.
2. Notation and Basic Concepts
Let V be the number of voters, n the number of parties and S the number of seats to be distributed;
(V1, V2, . . . , Vn) is the vector whose components are the votes obtained by each party, so that V =
n
∑
i=1
Vi; on the other hand, (S1, S2, . . . , Sn) is the vector whose components are the seats assigned to
each party, where S =
n
∑
i=1
Si; finally, we denote by vi and si the proportion of votes and seats that party
i receives. Thus, vi = Vi/V and si = Si/S are the vote and seat shares, respectively, for each party i.
A party i is overrepresented when si > vi, and underrepresented when si < vi. Any of these
inequalities represents a distortion with respect to the voters’ real preferences.
The quota (or “fair share”) is the number of seats that the party i should receive in exact
proportionality after obtaining Vi votes. That is, the quota for party i results qi =
Vi
V S.
In terms of the quota, a party is underrepresented if Si < qi and overrepresented if Si > qi. Since
n
∑
i=1
Si =
n
∑
i=1
qi, if a party is underrepresented, at least another one will be overrepresented.
The lower quota is the closest integer number that does not exceed qi; it will be denoted by bqic.
Likewise, the upper quota is the smallest integer number bigger than or equal to qi; it will be denoted
by dqie. In other terms, the lower quota is obtained by rounding down qi, and the upper quota by
rounding up qi.
Usually, for each party, quotas are fractional numbers and hence dqie = bqic+ 1. Otherwise, if qi
is an integer number, then bqic = dqie. The interval whose extremes are lower and upper quotas will
be called quota interval.
An apportionment satisfies the quota rule if the number of seats Si assigned to each party
differs from its quota less than one, this is: |qi − Si| < 1, or equivalently, bqic ≤ Si ≤ dqie for each
i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
On the other hand we will say that a party is overrepresented with respect to the upper quota if
Si > dqie; and is underrepresented with respect to the lower quota if Si < bqic. Obviously, these are
more restrictive requirements for parties than being merely overrepresented or underrepresented.
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3. Some Indexes of Electoral Disproportionality and Their Relationship
The literature on indexes is devoted to measuring the quality of an electoral system, in some way.
One of the most important issues in this context is electoral disproportionality, which could be defined
as the deviation level of vote and seat shares of the participating parties in an election.
In order to determine electoral disproportionality various indexes have been proposed.
As aforementioned, compilations of these indexes have been made by different authors
(Taagepera and Grofman 2003; Karpov 2008). Among them, the maximum deviation index, the
Loosemore-Hanby index proposed by Loosemore and Hanby (1971) and the least squares index,
presented by Gallagher (1991), are some of the most frequently used ones.
3.1. Maximum Deviation Index
This index measures the maximum difference between vote and seat shares in absolute terms.
The mathematical expression for this index is:
IMD = max
i=1,...,n
|si − vi|.
As it can be observed, the maximum deviation index only provides information of one party that
can be either the most underrepresented or overrepresented one, regardless of the deviation sizes of
the other parties.
3.2. Loosemore-Hanby Index
This index adds all the deviations generated during the allocation, meaning the sum of absolute
values of the differences between the vote and seat shares. Mathematically the index is defined as
ILH =
1
2
n
∑
i=1
|si − vi|.
The sum of absolute values of the differences between the vote and seat shares for overrepresented
parties coincides with the same sum for underrepresented ones. Hence, the total sum appearing in
ILH is divided by two in order to obtain the seat share that has not been distributed in a completely
proportional way.
3.3. Gallagher Index
The least squares index is also known as Gallagher index, and it is defined as the square root
of the sum of the squared differences between vote and seat shares of every party divided by two.
Formally:
IG =
√
1
2
n
∑
i=1
(si − vi)2.
This index takes into account both big and small deviations in the proportion of assigned seats
and obtained votes. However, small differences have less influence than big differences. Consequently,
this index is less sensitive than the previous one to the appearance of small parties.
3.4. Relationship among Disproportionality Indexes
Obviously, ILH = IMD = IG = 0 if and only if there exists exact proportionality, i.e., the
percentage of votes equals that of seats for each party. Some further relations among these indexes
can be established. It is straightforward that ILH = IMD if and only if there exists either just one
overrepresented or just one underrepresented party. On the other hand, if there are at least two
overrepresented parties jointly with another two underrepresented ones, it is straightforward that
ILH > IMD.
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On the other hand, Borisyuk et al. (2004) proved that IG ≤ ILH . Besides, it is easy to check that
IG = ILH if and only if there is exactly one overrepresented party jointly with just one underrepresented
party. In both cases, also IMD reaches the same value.
Finally, taking into account the aforementioned relationships concerning the considered indexes
we can assert that, if there are at least two overrepresented parties jointly with another two
underrepresented ones, then ILH > max{IMD, IG}.
4. The Quota Index
All the aforementioned indexes measure deviations between vote and seat shares, and hence,
in an implicit way, they take into account the quota as a point of reference. For example, the
Loosemore-Hanby index can be expressed in quota terms as
ILH =
1
2
n
∑
i=1
|si − vi| = 12S
n
∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣SiS S− ViV S
∣∣∣∣ = 12S n∑i=1|Si − qi|.
Note that ILH = 0 if and only if Si = qi for all the parties (this is also true for the previously considered
indexes). However, as the seats are indivisible, this situation requires all qi to be integer numbers, and
this is extremely unlikely. Therefore, exact proportionality becomes almost impossible in real elections.
On the other hand, in terms of seat transference ILH can be understood as the proportion of
seats that we need to transfer from overrepresented parties to underrepresented ones in order to
achieve exact proportionality. However, this is merely a theoretical value because, again, such exact
proportionality would require the seats to be divided.
This is the reason why we have focused our attention not in exact apportionments, but in those
staying within the quota, which is a more plausible condition. These considerations do not mean that
we advocate for apportionment methods verifying the quota rule, as the largest remainders (a.k.a.
Hamilton) rule. That is, regardless of the used method, our aim is measuring post hoc deviations from
the quota interval.
If the quota qi is not an integer number for some party, depending on the value of Si, two kinds of
disproportionality can be considered. We will say that in an allocation of seats, there exists non-forced
disproportionality if some party does not verify the quota condition (i.e., it is overrepresented with
respect to the upper quota or underrepresented with respect to the lower quota). Otherwise, the quota
rule is satisfied for all the parties and we will talk about forced disproportionality, unavoidable due to
the nature of the apportionment problem. Such considerations are illustrated in Figure 1.
These ideas have been taken into account in our proposal, in which we only measure non-forced
disproportionality (i.e., beyond de quota interval): That is, only distances of overrepresented parties
from their upper quotas or underrepresented parties from their lower quotas are considered. In this
way, we have defined an index, called quota index, as
Iq =
1
S
max

n
∑
i = 1
Si > qi
(Si − dqie),
n
∑
i = 1
Si < qi
(bqic − Si)

.
The value of Iq is between zero and one. The zero value corresponds to any distribution that
verifies the quota rule, while the maximum disproportionality will be reached when all the seats are
assigned to parties with no votes. It is worth noting that, while Loosemore-Hanby and the other
aforementioned indexes are zero if and only if the apportionment is exact, Iq can be zero without this
requirement. But, obviously, Iq is also zero if there exists exact proportionality.
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Moreov r, our index has an interesting in erpretation in transference terms: The quota index
Iq is the minimum proportion of seats in a parliament of S seats that we would need to transfer
from overrepresented parties with respect to the upper quota to others underrepresented (or from
overrepresented parties to others underrepresented with respect to the lower quota), for the quota rule
to be verified. And S·Iq will be exactly the minimum number of seats that would have to be transferred
from some parties to others for the distribution to verify the quota condition at a global level. This fact
will be illustrated in Section 6 concerning 2016 Spanish elections.
5. Quota Index Analysis and Relationships with Other Indexes
Karpov (2008), Taagepera and Grofman (2003) and Taagepera (2007) propose some reasonable
properties and analyze their fulfillment for several disproportionality indexes, the maximum deviation,
the Loosemore-Hanby index and the Gallagher indexes among them. In this section, after showing the
difference of perspectives between the above-mentioned indexes and the new one, we will test for Iq
the most relevant properties appearing in the literature.
In what follows, we will formulate the above-mentioned disproportionality indexes in terms of
the quota. In Section 4 we have shown that:
ILH =
1
2S
n
∑
i=1
|Si − qi|.
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In a similar way, it is easy to check that:
IMD =
1
S
max
i=1,...,n
|Si − qi|,
and
IG =
1
S
√
1
2
n
∑
i=1
(Si − qi)2.
These expressions are intended to establish in an easy way their relationships with the quota
index. It will be also used in further computations.
5.1. Quota Index and Disproportionality Indexes: Difference of Scopes
In Section 4, disproportionality has been split into two types. As shown in the previous
expressions, traditional approaches to this issue measure the distances from quotas, and hence they
take into account both forced and non-forced disproportionality. On the other hand, the quota index
just measures distances to the quota interval, and therefore just consider non-forced disproportionality.
In other words, usual disproportionality indexes contemplate underrepresented on overrepresented
parties, while the quota index just considers those over the upper quota or below the lower quota.
The following example illustrates these aspects.
Example 1. Consider parties A and B, and let the number of seats to allocateS = 10. Suppose that SA = 8
and qA = 7.6 are the number of seats and the respective quota of the party A. Also consider that SB = 2 and
qB = 2.4 are the number of seats and the quota of the party B, respectively. Then, we obtain:
IMD = ILH = IG = 0.04.
However, as the quota rule is verified, Iq = 0. Notice that with these data all the appearing disproportionality
is forced (unavoidable).
5.2. Disproportionality Indexes Properties and Quota Index
Following Karpov (2008), some compelling properties are taken into account:
1. Anonymity: Any permutation of party labels does not change the value of the index.
2. Principle of transfers: If we transfer a seat from an overrepresented party to an underrepresented
one, then the value of the index should not increase.
3. Independence from split: Suppose there are many parties with equal vote and seat shares, and these
parties are grouped into one. Then, the value of the index calculated for all the parties in the
group should be equal to the value of the index for the group considered as a whole.
4. Scale invariance (homogeneity): The index should not depend on any proportional change in the
number of votes or seats
5. Zero normalization: This property is satisfied if, when vi = si for all i = 1, . . . , n, then the value of
the index is 0.
Next, we will check the fulfillment of the previous properties by Iq.
Proposition 1. The indexIq satisfies anonymity, principle of transfers and zero normalization.
(The proof can be found in Appendix A).
Now, Example 2 shows that Iq does not satisfy the property of independence from split.
Example 2. Suppose nine parties whose quotas and assigned seats appear in Table 1, where S = 6.
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Table 1. Electoral data for testing independence from split (before grouping).
Parties
Results A B C D E F G H I
qi 1.4 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Si 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Calculating separately Iq for all the appearing parties, we obtain:
Iq = max
{
3− d1.4e+ 3− d1.4e
6
, 0
}
=
2
6
= 0.33.
Now, in Table 2, Iq is calculated for parties with equal percentage of seats and quotas as unique coalitions:
Table 2. Electoral data for testing independence from split (after grouping).
Parties Coalitions
Results A + B C + D + E F + G + H + I
qi 2.8 1.2 2
Si 6 0 0
And hence
Iq = max
{
6− d2.8e
6
,
b1.2c − 0 + (2− 0)
6
}
=
3
6
= 0.5.
Table 3 shows the properties that IMD, ILH , IG and Iq satisfy or do not (Karpov (2008) and
Taagepera and Grofman (2003) for the three first indexes). A “+” sign means that the index satisfies
the property and “−” means that it does not. Occasionally, these signs may appear enclosed into
parentheses to point out that the corresponding property is or not satisfied under specific circumstances.
Table 3. Summary of indexes and properties.
Index Anonymity TransferPrinciple
Independence
from Split
Scale
Invariance
Zero
Normalizing
IMD + (+) − + +
ILH + (+) + + +
IG + (+) − + +
Iq + + − (−) +
Parentheses appearing in the column relative to the Principle of Transfers in Table 3 mean that
IMD, ILH and IG may violate the principle of transfers in some situations, as shown in Example 3.
Example 3. Consider parties A and B, and S = 10. Suppose that qA = 7.6, SA = 8, qB = 2.4 and SB = 2.
That is, A is overrepresented and B is underrepresented. In this situation:
IMD = ILH = IG = 0.04.
Now, if we transfer a seat from A to B :
IMD = ILH = IG = 0.06.
Note that, in this example, after the seat transference the overrepresented party becomes underrepresented,
and vice versa.
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However, it is easy to check that IMD, ILH and IG satisfy a weaker Principle of Transfers
establishing that, if a seat is transferred from an overrepresented party verifying Si − qi > 0.5 to
an underrepresented one that satisfies qi − Si > 0.5, then the value of these indexes should not increase.
In particular, this situation happens when a seat is transferred from an overrepresented party with
respect to the upper quota to an underrepresented one with respect to the lower quota. Concerning
different versions of the Principle of Transfers in electoral disproportionality and their connection with
the original Dalton’s Principle in more general inequality contexts, see Taagepera and Grofman (2003),
Van Puyenbroeck (2008) and Goldenberg and Fisher (2017).
On the other hand, the parentheses appearing in the column relative to Scale Invariance in Table 3
means that Iq violates this property just with proportional changes in the number of seats, but not in
the number of votes, as shown in Example 4.
Example 4. Consider again parties A and B, and S = 10. Suppose that qA = 7.6, SA = 8, qB = 2.4 and
SB = 2. Note that in this situation the quota rule is satisfied and hence Iq = 0. If we multiply by 10 the number
of seats, that is, S = 100, we obtain qA = 76, SA = 80, qB = 24 and SB = 20. Now, the quota rule is not
verified and Iq = 0.04.
However, this fact should not be considered as a drawback of the index because the first situation cannot be
improved by transferring seats in any way, while in the second situation if we transfer S ∗ Iq = 4 seats from
party A to B, the quota rule is verified. Even more, in this case the apportionment becomes exact.
Concerning this issue, Boyssou et al. (2016) assert that although the homogeneity with respect
the number of seats “seems rather reasonable for large parliaments, a good disproportionality index
should perhaps be sensitive to the size of the parliament, at least for small parliaments”.
Obviously, proportional changes in the number of votes (maintaining the number of seats to
allocate) do not affect the quota and consequently neither the value of Iq.
Some other properties can be considered for a disproportionality index
(Taagepera and Grofman 2003; Taagepera 2007), among them:
• Informationally complete (makes use of all si and vi)
• Uses data for all parties uniformly
• Does not depend on the number of parties
• Varies between 0 and 1 (or 100%)
As shown by the previous authors, these properties are satisfied by the disproportionality indexes
considered along this paper, except the first one by IMD. On the other hand, it is straightforward that
Iq also verifies all of them.
5.3. Relationships among Iq and Disproportionality Indexes
The relationships existing among different disproportionality indexes have been shown in various
ways (Borisyuk et al. 2004; Bolun 2012). In the present paper some relationships that the quota index
has with the disproportionality indexes appearing above will be analyzed.
Proposition 2. The value of the quota index is always minor than or equal to the Loosemore-Hanby index:
Iq ≤ ILH .
(The proof can be found in Appendix A).
Proposition 3. The values of the quota and the maximum deviation indexes verify the following inequality:
Iq ≥ IMD − 1S .
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(The proof can be found in Appendix A).
Obviously, Iq = ILH = IMD = IG = 0 if there exists exact proportionality. If not, other relations
can be established. It is obvious that Iq = ILH if and only if qi are integer numbers for all the
overrepresented parties and the maximum of the expression of Iq is reached for these ones, or qi are
integer numbers for all the underrepresented parties and the maximum is reached for them. As these
situations are extremely unlikely, in general Iq < ILH .
On the other hand, it is straightforward that Iq = IMD if and only if there exists either just
one overrepresented party with respect to the upper quota and, in addition, its quota is an integer
number or just one underrepresented party with respect to the lower quota and, in addition, its quota
is an integer.
Finally, it is easy to check that Iq = IG if there is just one overrepresented party whose quota is an
integer number and, in addition, there is exactly one underrepresented party. In both cases, also IMD
reaches the same value. Otherwise both inequalities might appear between Iq and IG. For example,
in any allocation verifying the quota with no exact proportionality, Iq = 0 < IG. But if the quota
condition is not satisfied, the inequality might be reversed and, in fact, Iq < IG is unlikely (see results
in Section 6).
5.4. Discussion about Indexes
It can be observed that, as appearing in Table 3, none of the indexes considered along the paper is
optimal. This situation is somehow analogous (in another context) to those in Social Choice theory,
where is well known that there do not exist perfect voting systems nor apportionment methods, as
proven by Arrow and Balinski-Young theorems, respectively.
In fact, it is possible to find examples where all the considered indexes present some weaknesses,
as will be shown in what follows.
In an electoral situation where there exist non integer quotas (in fact, this is the most usual case),
it is impossible to achieve exact proportionality, but it is always possible to find an apportionment
verifying Iq = 0. It is a simple question of adjustment of each Si in its quota interval, so that, at the end
of the process
n
∑
i=1
Si = S. In such a situation, there are several possibilities of seat distribution staying
within the quota, and this fact might be considered as a criticism, as shown in Example 5.
Example 5. Consider parties A and B, and let the number of seats to allocate S = 5. Suppose that qA = 2.4
and qB = 2.6. In this situation there are two possibilities of seat distribution staying within the quota: SA = 2,
SB = 3 and S′A = 3, S
′
B = 2. Hence, Iq = I
′
q = 0.
However, the second allocation is less compelling than the first one, because the most voted party obtains
the least representation. In other terms, there exists a lack of vote/seat monotonicity in the last apportionment.
Now, notice that for the first allocation, we have IMD = ILH = IG = 0.08, while for the second allocation,
I′MD = I′LH = I′G = 0.12. Consequently, these indexes point out the first allotment as better than the
second one.
Nonetheless, Example 6 illustrates that the lack of monotonicity might not be captured (even
more, it can be inversely reflected) when the usual disproportionality indexes are used.
Example 6. Suppose eight parties whose quotas and assigned seats (in two different apportionments) appear in
Table 4, where S = 10.
The first seat distribution is intentionally arbitrary (in fact, it cannot be obtained by any divisor or quotient
method). However, the second distribution is obtained by any divisor method in the parametric family (Balinski
and Ramírez 1999) between Webster (Sainte-Laguë) and Jefferson (D’Hondt).
After some computations, the obtained values for quota and maximum deviation indexes in both allotments
are Iq = I′q = 0 and IMD = I′MD = 0.09. The first apportionment presents two pair of parties, (A, B) and
(C, D), where, in each of them, the most voted is the least represented. However, in this example, unlike the
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previous one, Loosemore-Hanby and Gallagher do no detect this lack of monotonicity. Even worse, they work in
the opposite way to that expected: ILH = 0.16, I′LH = 0.17 and IG = 0.094, I′G = 0.099.
Table 4. Electoral data for testing indexes suitability.
Results A B C D E F G H
qi 4.2 4.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
Si 4 5 0 1 0 0 0 0
S
′
i 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
6. Implementation of the Quota Index in Some Countries and Elections
We first study in depth the case of Spain along the last 25 years, paying special attention to the
transfer analysis in the 2016 elections, as well as to the overall correlation of the disproportionality
indexes previously calculated.
Afterwards, we merely calculate the considered indexes for another two countries, Sweden and
Germany, jointly with some comments on the results.
As a caveat, we note that slight (and hence negligible) differences might appear in the results, due
to the treatment (grouped or not) of small parties without representation.
All electoral data resources appear in Appendix C.
6.1. Spain (1993–2016)
In Spain there exists a party list proportional representation system. The Spanish Chamber of
Deputies has 350 members chosen in 52 districts. An exclusion threshold of 3% of the valid votes in
each district is applied. All these elements have not been modified from 1977. Disproportionality
partially occurs in Spain because population/representation shares are not balanced among districts.
Furthermore, due to the small size of districts, some parties whose votes are scattered all over the
country may obtain significantly fewer seats than other parties with a similar number of votes, if
geographically concentrated. Other causes of disproportionality in Spain are the use of the D’Hondt
rule, intended to favor larger parties.
Table 5 shows the values of maximum deviation, Loosemore-Hanby, Gallagher and the quota
indexes for the eight most recent elections in Spain.
Table 5. Disproportionality indexes for recent Spanish elections (in percentage).
Index 1993 1996 2000 2004 2008 2011 2015 2016
ILH 12.01 8.07 8.58 7.95 8.08 11.29 10.51 7.80
Iq 11.42 7.10 8.00 7.42 7.42 10.57 9.71 7.14
IG 6.81 5.32 5.60 4.63 4.50 6.91 5.92 5.23
IMD 6.33 5.39 7.04 3.97 3.92 7.89 6.21 5.86
S = 350
In all analyzed elections, ILH is bigger than Iq (as theoretically proven), while IG is the smallest
(hence, in particular, Iq > IG in all the cases). Remarkably, the quota rule never is globally satisfied,
given that always Iq 6= 0.
Focusing our attention in 2016, it can be observed that all the obtained values have decreased
from those corresponding to the previous elections. An important fact that can partially explain this
issue is that IU, a left-wing party, traditionally penalized by vote dispersion, formed a coalition with
the emergent party Podemos.
Following with the last Spanish elections, it is worth noting that ILH = 7.8% and S·ILH = 27.3.
This value corresponds to the number of seats to be transferred from some parties to others in order to
achieve exact proportionality. This is a theoretical value because seats cannot be divided. On the other
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hand, Iq = 7.14%, and hence S·Iq = 25, which means that this is the minimum number of seats to be
transferred for the apportionment to verify the quota. This is a feasible goal. Concretely, in order to
achieve this aim, 20 seats belonging to PP and 5 more seats from PSOE should be transferred to C’s
(14), PACMA (4) and Podemos-IU-EQUO (2). The remaining 5 seats should be moved, one by one, to
any other unrepresented party (see Appendix B for details).
Despite the fact that Iq solely measures non-forced disproportionality and the remaining indexes
are disproportionality ones, in what follows a correlation analysis among them is undertaken in order
to explore their relationships. Table 6 shows the results coming from data appearing in Table 5.
Table 6. Correlation among indexes for elections in Spain.
Indexes ILH Iq IG IMD
ILH 1
Iq 0.9990 1
IG 0.8991 0.9033 1
IMD 0.7051 0.7110 0.9311 1
The highest correlation value appears between ILH and Iq. This fact relies on the formal expression
of Iq which is somehow inspired by that of ILH , although the first one only measures avoidable
(beyond the quota interval) disproportionality. Hence, both indexes have different interpretations, as
aforementioned. On the other hand, IMD and ILH have the smallest correlation.
6.2. Other Countries
As aforementioned, we next calculate the considered disproportionality indexes for another two
countries, Sweden (proportional system) and Germany (mixed-member system).
6.2.1. Sweden (1998–2014)
Sweden is ranked in the third position worldwide according to the 2017 democratic index
developed by The Economist Intelligence Unit (www.eiu.com). The Swedish Parliament (Riksdag)
is composed of 349 seats elected under a proportional system. 310 of them belong to fixed constituency
seats and the remaining 39 are adjustment seats. Any particular party must receive at least 4% of the
national votes to be assigned a seat. Fixed seats are allocated among the parties using a method known
as the adjusted odd numbers method (or modified Sainte-Laguë).
The purpose of the 39 adjustment seats is to make sure that the distribution of seats among the
parties over the whole country should be as proportional in relation to the number of votes as possible.
The whole country is viewed as it was a single constituency and is then compared with the distribution
of votes in the 29 constituencies. The adjustment seats are allocated first according to party and then
according to the constituency (see www.riksdagen.se for details).
Table 7 shows the values of the ILH , Iq, IG and IMD indices in all the Swedish Riksdag elections
held from 1998 to 2014.
Table 7. Disproportionality indexes for recent Swedish elections (in percentage).
Index 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
ILH 2.52 2.92 6.67 2.07 4.04
Iq 1.72 2.01 5.44 1.72 3.15
IG 1.27 1.58 3.17 1.25 2.64
IMD 1.12 1.44 2.67 1.42 3.13
S = 349
It can be observed, as in the previously studied case, that Iq is always between IG and ILH .
Notice also that now the obtained results are lower than those for Spain. In fact, the Swedish electoral
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system produces a high proportionality unless one or several political parties have a percentage of
votes just a little below the electoral threshold (4%). Concretely, this situation happened in 2006 and
2014 because the Sweden Democrats and the Feminist Initiative parties obtained 2.9% and 3.1% of the
national votes, respectively.
6.2.2. Germany (1976–2017)
Germany’s electoral system is a combination of “first-past-the-post” election of constituency
candidates (first votes) and proportional representation on the basis of votes for the parties’ States
(Länder) lists (second votes). Hence, it is a mixed-member electoral system.
Concretely, half of the Members of the German Parliament (Bundestag) are elected directly from
Germany’s 299 constituencies, the other half via party lists in Germany’s sixteen Länder. Accordingly,
each voter casts two votes in the elections to the German Bundestag. The first vote, allowing voters
to elect their local representatives to the Bundestag, decides which candidates are sent to Parliament
from the constituencies. The second vote is cast for a party list. The 598 seats are distributed among
the parties that have gained more than 5% of the second votes or at least three constituency seats. Each
party receives the minimum between the number of seats obtained on the basis of the first votes and
those corresponding to the second votes. The Sainte-Laguë/Schepers method is used to convert the
votes into seats
In some circumstances, Parliament’s size may increase during the process of allocating the seats,
due to what are known as “overhang seats” and additional “balance seats” in order to maintain
proportionality (see www.bundestag.de for further details).
Table 8 shows the values of the ILH , Iq, IG and IMD indices in the German Bundestag elections
held from 1976 to the most recent in 2017.
Table 8. Disproportionality indexes for recent German elections (in percentage).
Size Index 1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009 2013 2017
ILH 8.05 3.61 4.72 8.45 4.33 6.01 15.69 5.00
Iq 7.40 3.27 4.19 8.33 3.75 5.63 15.21 4.51
IG 4.62 2.22 2.75 6.15 2.28 3.14 7.83 1.95
IMD 3.85 2.15 3.11 7.98 2.05 3.92 6.29 1.45
S 662 672 669 672 614 622 631 709
Notice that, again, the values of Iq are always between those of IG and ILH . Paying attention to
the historical sequence of data, the magnitude of the results obtained in 2013 is shocking. This high
disproportionality arose because, in this year, parties that did not overcome the electoral threshold
represented approximately 16% of the votes.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, the quota index (Iq) has been introduced and analyzed. It is worth mentioning that
this index is zero if and only if the quota rule is satisfied by all the parties, i.e., when only forced (i.e.,
unavoidable) disproportionality arises.
Remarkably, in our approach, Iq = 0 can occur even if the apportionment is not exact (in fact,
exact proportionality is almost impossible, due to the very nature of the apportionment problem).
Moreover, Iq corresponds to the minimum percentage of seats that is necessary to transfer among
parties for the quota rule to be verified. From this value it is possible to obtain the minimum number
of seats (being an integer number) that it would be necessary to transfer from some parties to others,
so that the seat distribution of the parliament will satisfy the quota condition.
After an electoral process, it is usual for the main party to be overrepresented. If the
underrepresentation is distributed among all the other parties and none of them stays below its
lower quota, then Iq will represent the surplus of the winning party calculated from its upper quota.
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Notice also that, contrary to other well-known disproportionality indexes, the existence of many small
parties with a quota less than the unit and without seat representation do not increase the value of Iq.
We have proven that the quota index verifies some compelling properties appearing in the
literature. In particular, it is worth noting that Iq gain an advantage over some of the most relevant
disproportionality indexes (maximum deviation, Loosemore-Hanby and Gallagher) when the principle
of transfers is considered. On the other hand, we have checked that the quota index is not homogenous
with respect to the number of seats, although it has been justified that this fact can make sense in
our context.
Finally, quantitative relationships have been established among the quota and the aforementioned
disproportionality indexes and all of them have been calculated for several elections in Spain,
Sweden and Germany. The obtained results show that there exists a high correlation among the
Loosemore-Hanby and quota indexes, but a major argument to use the last one is its interpretability in
terms of seat transfer.
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Appendix A. Proofs of the Propositions
Proposition 1. The index Iq satisfies anonymity, principle of transfers and zero normalization.
Proof:
• Anonymity
Given that the value of Iq is the maximum of two arguments:
n
∑
i = 1
Si > qi
(Si − dqie) and
n
∑
i = 1
Si < qi
(bqic − Si),
this property is immediate since it relies on commutative property for real numbers.
• Principle of transfers
Consider Sh and qh, number of seats assigned and quota for an overrepresented party h,
respectively. Let Sj and qj be the number of seats assigned and the quota for an underrepresented
party j, respectively. When a seat is transferred from h to j, the following cases can happen:
(1) If party h continues being overrepresented, then
Sh − dqhe > (Sh − 1)− dqhe ≥ 0.
(2) If party h becomes underrepresented, then
bqhc − (Sh − 1) = 0.
In such scenarios we can find any of these situations:
Economies 2019, 7, 17 14 of 17
(a) If party j continues being underrepresented, then⌊
qj
⌋− Sj > ⌊qj⌋− (Sj + 1) ≥ 0.
(b) If party j becomes overrepresented, then
(Sj + 1)−
⌈
qj
⌉
= 0.
Taking this into account, if a seat is transferred from an overrepresented party to an
underrepresented one Iq does not increase its value in any of the arguments of the maximum appearing
in its expression.
• Zero normalization
If vi = si for all i = 1, . . . , n, then
Vi
V =
Si
S and
Vi
V S = Si. Furthermore, we know that qi =
Vi
V S,
because qi = Si. Given that the number of assigned seats Si is an integer number and qi = Si, qi is also
an integer number, and then
⌈
qj
⌉
= bqic = qi. Therefore:
Iq = 1S max

n
∑
i = 1
Si > qi
(Si − dqie),
n
∑
i = 1
Si < qi
(bqic − Si)

=
= 1S max

n
∑
i = 1
Si > qi
(Si − Si),
n
∑
i = 1
Si < qi
(Si − Si)

= 0. 
Proposition 2. The value of the quota index is always minor than or equal to the Loosemore-Hanby index:
Iq ≤ ILH .
Proof: As aforementioned in Section 4, the Loosemore-Hanby index can be expressed in terms of the
quota as
ILH =
1
2S
n
∑
i=1
|Si − qi|.
On one hand, given that the sum of the terms corresponding to overrepresented parties is equal
to that corresponding to underrepresented ones, we obtain
ILH =
1
S
n
∑
i = 1
Si > qi
(Si − qi) = 1S
n
∑
i = 1
Si < qi
(qi − Si).
On the other hand,
n
∑
i = 1
Si > qi
(Si − qi) ≥
n
∑
i = 1
Si > qi
(Si − dqie),
n
∑
i = 1
Si < qi
(qi − Si) ≥
n
∑
i = 1
Si < qi
(bqic − Si).
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Thus, the maximum of the two terms appearing in the definition of Iq is less than or equal to ILH .

Proposition 3. The value of the quota indexes and the maximum deviation verify the following inequality:
Iq ≥ IMD − 1S .
Proof: Taking into account that
IMD =
1
S
max
i=1,..., n
|Si − qi|,
we consider two cases:
(a) If max
i=1,..., n
|Si − qi| is reached for underrepresented party u, then max
i=1,...,n
|Si − qi| = (qu − Su).
Therefore:
n
∑
i = 1
Si < qi
(bqic − Si) ≥ bquc − Su ≥ (qu − Su)− 1,
where the last inequality takes into account that bquc ≥ qu − 1. Dividing both extreme members
by S, we have
1
S
n
∑
i = 1
Si < qi
(bqic − Si) ≥ (qu − Su)S −
1
S
=
max
i=1,...,n
|Si − qi|
S
− 1
S
,Iq ≥ IMD − 1S
(b) If max
i=1,...,n
|Si − qi|, is reached for a party o that is overrepresented, then max
i=1,...,n
|Si − qi| = (So − qo).
Therefore:
n
∑
i = 1
Si > qi
(Si − dqie) ≥ So − dqoe ≥ (So − qo)− 1,
where the last inequality takes into account that qo + 1 ≥ dqoe. Dividing both extreme members
by S, we have
1
S
n
∑
i = 1
Si > qi
(Si − dqie) ≥ (qo − So)S −
1
S
=
max
i=1,...,n
|Si − qi|
S
− 1
S
.
In consequence, Iq ≥ IMD − 1S . 
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Appendix B.
Table A1. Spanish Electoral Results (2016).
Parties Votes Quotas Seats
PP 7906.185 116.48 137
PSOE 5424.709 79.92 85
PODEMOS-IU-EQUO 3201.170 47.16 45
C’s 3123.769 46.02 32
ECP 848.526 12.50 12
PODEMOS-COMPROMÍS-EUPV 655.895 9.66 9
ERC-CATSÍ 629.294 9.27 9
CDC 481.839 7.10 8
PODEMOS-EN MAREA-ANOVA-EU 344.143 5.07 5
EAJ-PNV 286.215 4.22 5
EH Bildu 184.092 2.71 2
CCa-PNC 78.080 1.15 1
PACMA 284.848 4.20
RECORTES CERO-GRUPO VERDE 51.742 0.76
UPyD 50.282 0.74
VOX 46.781 0.69
BNG-NÓS 44.902 0.66
PCPE 26.553 0.39
GBAI 14.289 0.21
EB 12.024 0.18
FE de las JONS 9.862 0.15
SI 7.413 0.11
SOMVAL 6.612 0.10
CCD 6.264 0.09
PH 3.288 0.05
SAIn 3.221 0.05
P-LIB 3.103 0.05
CENTRO MODERADO 2.986 0.04
CCD-CI 2.668 0.04
UPL 2.307 0.03
PCOE 1.812 0.03
AND 1.695 0.02
JXC 1.184 0.02
IZAR 854 0.01
CILUS 847 0.01
PFyV 838 0.01
PxC 722 0.01
MAS 718 0.01
UNIDAD DEL PUEBLO 684 0.01
PREPAL 640 0.01
Ln 617 0.01
REPO 569 0.01
INDEPENDIENTES-FIA 556 0.01
IMC 351 0.01
FME 338 0.00
PUEDE 330 0.00
ENTABAN 257 0.00
FE 254 0.00
ALCD 210 0.00
HRTS-Ln 82 0.00
UDT 54 0.00
Total 23,756.674 350 350
Source: Ministry of Interior (Spain).
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Appendix C. Electoral Data Resources
Spain: www.infoelectoral.mir.es/infoelectoral/min/.
Sweden: www.electionresources.org/se/.
Germany: www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2017/publikationen.html.
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